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Abstract. The Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI) architecture is increasingly be-
ing used in a wide range of complex applications for agents. Many theories and
models exist which support this architecture and the recent version is that of Ca-
pability being added as an additional construct. In all these models the concept
of action is seen in an endogenous manner. We argue that the Result of an action
performed by an agent is extremely important when dealing with composite ac-
tions and hence the need for an explicit representation of them. The Capability
factor is supported using a RES construct and it is shown how the components of
a composite action is supported using these two. Further, we introduce an OPP
(opportunity) operator which in alliance with Result and Capability provides bet-
ter semantics for practical reasoning in BDI.
1 Introduction
A paradigm shift is happening in both Arti£cial Intelligence and mainstream computer
science with the advent of agents and agent-oriented approaches to developing systems,
both on a theoretical and practical level. One such approach called BDI takes mental
attitudes like Belief, Desire and Intention as the primitives and has given rise to a set
of systems called Intentional Agent Systems [2, 5, 7, 9]. Of these the one by Rao and
Georgeff [13] has been widely investigated due to its strong links with theoretical work.
Many modi£cations have been made since the initial work, the most recent being the
addition of a Capability [11] construct along with the three primitive modalities. In
all these systems the concept of action is seen in an endogenous manner. Though it is
possible to come up with accounts of action without representing them explicitly, many
problems that plague endogenous formalisations can be avoided in exogenous ones. The
later work by Rao [12] makes this shift but then it is restricted to the planning domain.
This paper can be viewed as a further extension of the existing BDI theory whereby
we reason about the mental state of an agent during the execution of an action in an
exogenous way. We investigate the close connection between the result of an action
performed by a BDI agent and its capability of achieving that result. We argue that
though the agent might have a capability to perform an action it need not be the case
that the opportunity should always accompany it. This view gets importance when we
take into consideration composite actions where one action follows the other (φ1;φ2),
which means an agent performs φ1 followed by φ2. In such cases the result of the com-
ponent parts of the action is needed for the overall success of the action. It also seems
reasonable to declare that the agent has the relevant opportunity to perform the com-
ponent actions in such a way that the execution leads to an appropriate state of affairs.
By making actions explicit in BDI we try to avoid some of the problems that plague
the endogenous systems when dealing with composite actions. We describe a formal
relationship between the Result, Opportunity, Belief, Desire and Intention modalities. It
is important to note the close connection between Intention and Result. For instance, if
an agent intends to perform a plan, we can infer under certain conditions he intends the
result of the plan. Similar is the case with Goals and Results.
This work is partially motivated by the KARO architecture of Van Linder [10]
whereby we indicate how Result and Opportunity can be integrated to the existing BDI
framework. Such an addition de£nitely paves way for a better understanding of the dy-
namics of BDI Systems. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we
make a distinction between intentional action (actions with a pre-de£ned intention) and
intending an action (actions with future Intention) and claim that composite actions
£t well under actions with future intention. Section 3 gives a brief summary about the
original BDI logic as developed by Rao [13] and the recent version of it with the Capa-
bility construct [11]. Sections 4 and 5 integrate two new operators RES and OPP with
the existing BDI architecture. Section 6 gives the full picture of the new semantics. We
have purposefully avoided the use of any temporal operators as it remains part of the
future work. In section 7 we formalise the commitment axioms according to the new
semantics and the conclusion and future work is depicted in section 8.
2 Intentional Action & Intending an Action
When one takes into account the compositional nature of actions φ1;φ2 (φ1 followed
by φ2), it seems contradictory to believe that endogenous logics alone can account for
the mental state of an agent during the execution of such actions. The problem with
the current formalisms is in their failure to differentiate Intentional Action (Prede£ned
Intention) from Intending to do an Action (Future Intention). Most of the work in BDI
represent actions in the former manner. In the work of Rao [13] formulas like BEL(Φ),
GOAL(Φ) etc. are used to denote the belief and goal of an agent performing an action φ.
The formalism remains true for single actions, but when it comes to composite actions
like (φ1;φ2) it fails to do justice as it is taken for granted that the execution of the £rst
action necessarily leads to the second without mentioning anything about the result of
the £rst action on the second. Based on the existing BDI architecture the concept of
composite actions could be formalised as
INT(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒ does(φ1;φ2).
This need not be the case as the performance of φ1 could result in a counterfactual state
of affairs. It seems crucial to consider the result of the £rst action for the overall success
of the composite action. In the same manner the formulas like
GOAL(φ1;φ2) ⇒ CAP(GOAL(φ1;φ2))
seem to be problematic as the formulation doesn’t tell anything about the ability of the
agent if the £rst action results in a counterfactual state of affairs. It doesn’t mention
anything regarding the Opportunity the agent has in performing the second action.
It is important to make a division between the two action constructs of Intentional
and Intending for our framework. The former relates to a prede£ned intention, where the
Result of an action is taken for granted, whereas the latter concerns a future intention,
where further deliberation is done as to what the result would be before an action is per-
formed. Davidson [6] oversees such a division and extends the concept of intentionally
doing to that of intending to. Though Bratman [1] points out this disparity the current
formalisms does not allow for sound representation using the existing modal operators.
Hence the need for additional constructs like RES and OPP. In intentional action, there
is no temporal interval between what Davidson terms as all-out evaluation and action.
So there is no room for further practical reasoning in which that all-out evaluation can
play a signi£cant role as input. The BDI framework gives primary importance to prac-
tical reasoning and hence to means-end reasoning which is important to avoid further
deliberation at the time of action. Therefore it seems appropriate to categorise compos-
ite actions under future intentions as they play a crucial role in our practical thinking.
More importantly, we form future intentions as part of larger plans whose role is to
aid co-ordination of our activities over time. As elements in these plans, future inten-
tions force the formation of yet further intentions and constrain the formation of other
intentions and plans.
3 The BDI Logic
The logic developed by Rao and Georgeff [13] is based on Computational Tree Logic
(CTL∗) [4] extended with a £rst order variant for the basic logic and a possible-worlds
framework for the Belief, Goal and Intention operators. The world is modelled using a
temporal structure with a branching time future and a single past called a time-tree. A
situation refers to a particular time point in a particular world. Situations are mapped
to one another by occurrence of events. The branches in a time tree can be viewed as
representing the choices available to the agent at each moment in time. There are two
kinds of formulae in the logic called the state formulae and path formulae. The former
are evaluated at a speci£ed time point in a time tree and the latter over a speci£ed path
in a time tree. Two modal operators optional and inevitable are used for path formulas.
optional is said to be true of a path formula Φ at a particular point in a time-tree if Φ is
true of at least one path emanating from that point. inevitable is said to be true of a path
formula Φ at a particular point in a time-tree if Φ is true of all paths emanating from
that point. The standard temporal operators 3 (eventually), 2 (always), © (next) and⋃ (until), operate over state and path formulae. These modalities can be combined to
describe the options of an agent.
Beliefs, Goals and Intentions are modelled as a set of belief-, goal- and intention
accessible worlds associated to an agent in each situation. An agent x has a belief Φ,
at a time point t (BEL(Φ)), if Φ is true in all belief-accessible worlds. It is the same
case for goals (GOAL(Φ)) and intentions (INT(Φ)). The logic is based on the concept
of strong realism which requires the goals to be compatible with beliefs, and intentions
with goals. This is done by requiring that for every belief-accessible world w at time-
point t, there is a desire-accessible world w′ at that time point which is a sub-world for
w. The converse does not hold as there can be desire-accessible worlds that do not have
corresponding belief-accessible worlds. There are similar relationships between goal-
accessible and intention-accessible worlds. The axiomatization of beliefs is the standard
weak-S5 (or KD45) modal system [8]. The D and K axioms are adopted for goals and
intentions, which means that goals and intentions have to be closed under implication
and have to be consistent. We are concerned with the semantics of the mental attitudes
and the details concerning the possible worlds semantics for various state and path
formulae, is given in Appendix A. The set of belief-accessible worlds of an agent x
from world w at time t, is denoted by Bwt (x). Similarly we use Gwt (x) and Iwt (x) to
denote set of Goal and Intention-accessible worlds of agent x in world w at time t,
respectively. When we state the rules and axioms the world w is taken for granted and
the formalism is based on the agent, action and time. The semantics for beliefs, goals
and intentions can be de£ned formally as follows
De£nition 1 For an interpretation M , with a variable assignment v, a possible world
w and a temporal variable t, the semantics for the mental attitudes can be given as:
– M,v,wt |= BEL(Φ) iff ∀w′ ∈ Bwt (x), 〈M,v,w′t〉 |= Φ;
– M,v,wt |= GOAL(Φ) iff ∀w′ ∈ Gwt (x), 〈M,v,w′t〉 |= Φ;
– M,v,wt |= INT(Φ) iff ∀w′ ∈ Iwt (x), 〈M,v,w′t〉 |= Φ.
The rules and axioms depicting the semantic conditions is given as in [13]. The temporal
variable t stands for a constant. We do not make any explicit representation of time as
it remains part of future work.
De£nition 2 Let Φ be a formula, BEL, INT and GOAL be the modal operators for
the mental constructs, done, does be the operators for event types, and inevitable be
the modal operator for a path formulae; then we have the following axioms:
A1 GOAL(Φ) ⇒ BEL(Φ)
A2 INT(Φ) ⇒ GOAL(Φ)
A3 INT(does(e)) ⇒ does(e)
A4 INT(Φ) ⇒ BEL(INT(Φ))
A5 GOAL(Φ) ⇒ BEL(GOAL(Φ))
A6 INT(Φ) ⇒ GOAL(INT(Φ))
A7 done(e) ⇒ BEL(done(e))
A8 INT(Φ) ⇒ inevitable3(¬INT(Φ))
Axiom A3 seems to be problematic because of the fact that the event e need not be
necessarily restricted to a single action. If the agent has a choice of actions at the current
time point, he/she would be incapable of acting intentionally until she deliberates and
chooses one of them. It is the same case when the particular event is a composite action.
The agent needs to deliberate on the result of the £rst action for the successful execution
of the second one. It might also be the case that the agent lacks the relevant opportunity
at that particular time point of doing the speci£c action. It becomes more relevant with
the addition of the capability construct as given below.
The basic axioms with the capability construct are the same as those given in [11].
The temporal variable has been added in the semantics.
C1 CAP(Φ) ⇒ BEL(Φ)
C2 GOAL(Φ) ⇒ CAP(Φ)
C3 CAP(Φ) ⇒ BEL(CAP(Φ))
C4 GOAL(Φ) ⇒ CAP(GOAL(Φ))
C5 INT(Φ) ⇒ CAP(INT(Φ))
The semantic condition of C2 and C3 can be given as follows
De£nition 3 Let Cwt (x) be the set of capability-accessible worlds of agent x in world
w at time t.
– ∀w′ ∈ Cwt (x),∃w
′′ ∈ Gwt (x) such that w′′ v w′;
– ∀w′ ∈ Bwt ,∀w
′′ ∈ Cw
′
t (x) we have w′′ ∈ Cwt (x)
The £rst constraint means that for every capability-accessible world w ′ at time-point t,
there is a goal-accessible world w′′ at that time-point which is sub-world of w′. The
converse doesn’t hold as there can be goal-accessible worlds that do not have cor-
responding capability-accessible worlds. The second constraint is more complicated
and deviates from the original interpretation as in [13]. It means that for every belief-
accessible world w′ at time-point t, all the capability-accessible worlds w′′ which is a
member of the belief (capability)-accessible worlds w′ at time-point t is a member of
the capability-accessible worlds w at time-point t, i.e., if the agent has a capability to
achieve Φ, then the agent believes that she has such a capability.
4 Integrating Results
The BDI logic and the semantic conditions stated in the previous section shows that the
compositional behaviour of actions has not been dealt within the BDI architecture. With
the recent addition of the Capability construct we believe that it is worthwhile exploring
this concept. Whereas the BDI framework is concerned with £nding out what it means
exactly to have the ability to perform some action, we try to focus on the compositional
behaviour of actions. In other terms we are concerned with £nding a relation between
the capability to perform a composite action and relate it with the capability for the
components of that action. Not all actions are treated equally in our approach but instead
the result of each action is determined individually and then the conclusion is made
whether the agent succeeds in performing that action. Three types of actions are dealt
with (φ1;φ2) (φ1 followed by φ2), (while Φ do ψ) (ψ as long as Φ holds) and (if Φ then
φ1 else φ2) (φ1 ifΦ holds and φ2 otherwise). The composite action (φ1;φ2) is discussed
in detail. An additional operator RES (result) is introduced to show the success/failure
of the component actions. The RES operator functions as a practition operator which
indicates the sequence of actions being performed, i.e., which action is performed next.
The existing BDI architecture doesn’t mention anything about the actual execution of
actions. Since the transition caused by the execution of the action (φ1;φ2) equals the
sum of the transition caused by φ1 and the one caused by φ2 in the state brought about
by execution of φ1, the RES operator helps in acting as a £lter which checks whether
the £rst action results in a counterfactual state or not. Such a £ltering helps in avoiding
further deliberation at the time of action as would otherwise be in situations arising
from counterfactual states. For example, the success of the printer command (lpr), in a
unix environment, depends on the result of the execution of the command in the spooler
phase followed by the recognition of the command by the printer in the communication
phase. Here the action needs to be broken down into compartments and the success
of each action should be validated for the overall success. In such circumstances the
RES operator helps in providing the necessary speci£cation. This goes in alliance with
our view of categorising composite actions under future intentions, where the scope of
practical reasoning is more.
De£nition 4 Let φ1, φ2 be actions, then the axioms for the operator RES are:
R1 CAP(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
BEL(does(φi)) ∧ BEL(RES(does(φ1))) 6= ⊥
R2 GOAL(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
CAP(does(φi)) ∧ RES(does(φ1)) 6= ⊥
R3 CAP(doesφ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
BEL(CAP(does(φi))) ∧ RES(does(φ1)) 6= ⊥
R4 GOAL(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
CAP(GOAL(does(φi))) ∧ RES(does(φ1)) 6= ⊥
R5 INT(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
CAP(INT(does(φi))) ∧ RES(does(φ1)) 6= ⊥
The £rst axiom states that an agent has the capability of performing a composite action
φ1;φ2 then at some point of time the agent believes in doing φ1 and φ2 and believes
that the performance of φ1 does not end in counterfactual state of affairs (i.e, it does
not end in falsity). Similarly the third axiom states that an agent has the capability of
performing a composite action φ1;φ2, then at some point of time, the agent believes
that it has the capability of doing φ1 and believes in the capability of doing φ2 and the
result of φ1 does not end up in a counterfactual state of affairs.
The semantic conditions for RES are similar to those given in De£nition 3. For
instance it can be shown that the semantic condition for R2 is
∀w′ ∈ Cwt (x),∃w
′′ ∈ Gwt (x),∃w
′′′ ∈ Rwt (x) such that w′′ v w′ and w′′′ v w′
where Rwt (x) is the set of result-accessible worlds of agent x in world w at time t.
This constraint means that for every capability-accessible world w′ at time-point t,
there is a goal-accessible world w′′ at that time-point which is a sub-world of w′ and a
result-accessible world w′′′ which is a sub-world of w′. The converse doesn’t hold as
there can be Goal-accessible worlds that do not have corresponding capability as well
as result-accessible worlds that do not have corresponding capability but only has the
opportunity. We shall deal with the opportunity construct in the next section.
The action constructors dealing with while Φ do ψ (which means that ψ as long
as Φ holds) and if Φ then φ1 else φ2 (φ1 if Φ holds and φ2 otherwise) is crucial from
computational point of view. For an agent to be able to perform an action while Φ do ψ it
has to have the ability to perform some £nite actions constituting the body of the while-
loop as well as the opportunity to perform all the steps. Agents should not be able to
perform an action that goes inde£nitely. These speci£cations are formally represented
by the following two axioms.
R6 CAP(while Φ do ψ)⇒ [¬Φ∨(Φ∧BEL(CAP(does(ψ))))∧RES(done(φ)) 6= ⊥]
R7 CAP(if Φ then φ1 else φ2) ⇒
[Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(φ1))) ∧ RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥] ∨
[¬Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(φ2))) ∧ RES(done(φ2)) 6= ⊥].
The £rst proposition states that an agent is capable of performing an action while Φ do
ψ, as long as Φ holds and the agent believes that it has the capability of ψ and result
of ψ does not end in falsity. Similarly R7 can be read as, an agent has the capability of
performing an action if Φ then φ1 else φ2, if Φ holds and the agent believes that it has
the capability of φ1 and the result of φ1 is true, or it is the case that, Φ does not hold
and the agent believes that it has the capability of φ2 and result of φ2 does not end in a
counterfactual state of affairs.
5 Integrating Opportunity
Though in many cases it seems reasonable to assume that Capability implies Opportu-
nity, when it comes to practical reasoning Opportunity seem to play a signi£cant role.
Van Linder [10] explains opportunity in terms of the correctness of action. An action
is correct for some agent to bring about some proposition iff(if and only if ) the agent
has the opportunity to perform the action in such a way that its performance results in
the proposition being true. Integrating opportunity lays further constraint on the part
of the agent to think about an action before getting committed. Consider the example
of a lion in a cage, which is perfectly well capable of eating a zebra, but ideally never
has the opportunity to do so.1 Using the BDI formalism we would have to conclude
that the lion is capable of performing the sequential composition eat zebra ; ¤y to the
moon which hardly seems to be intuitive. In such situations it is very important to know
the combination of Capability and Opportunity so that no unwarranted conclusions can
be drawn. We introduce an operator OPP whose intuitive meaning is agent x has the
opportunity. The axioms for the OPP operator together with the Capability construct
can be given as follows
De£nition 5 Let φ1, φ2 be actions, then we have
O1 CAP(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
BEL(OPP(does(φi)))
O2 GOAL(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
CAP(does(φi)) ∧OPP(does(φi))
O3 CAP(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
BEL(CAP(does(φi))) ∧OPP(does(φi))
1 The example is taken from [10].
O4 GOAL(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
CAP(GOAL(does(φi))) ∧OPP(does(φi))
O5 INT(does(φ1;φ2) ⇒
∧
i=1,2
CAP(INT(does(φi))) ∧OPP(does(φi))
O6 CAP(while Φ do ψ ) ⇒ [¬Φ ∨ (Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(ψ)))) ∧OPP(does(ψ))]
O7 CAP(if Φ then φ1 else φ2) ⇒ [Φ ∧BEL(CAP(does(φ1))) ∧OPP(does(φ1))] ∨
[¬Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(φ2))) ∧OPP(does(φ2))]
The third axiom states that an agent has the capability of performing φ1;φ2 then the
agent believes that he has the capability of φ1, if he has the opportunity of φ1, and, he
has the capability of φ2, if he has the opportunity of φ2. Similarly O7 can be interpreted
as an agent has the capability of doing the action (if Φ then φ1 else φ2) then either Φ
holds and the agent believes that he/she has the capability of φ1 provided the opportu-
nity exists or ¬Φ holds and the agent has the capability of φ2 provided the opportunity
exists. The other axioms can be interpreted in a similar manner.
6 Opportunity + Results
In [10] a division is made between optimistic and pessimistic agents and the interpreta-
tion of the OPP formulae is done accordingly. They make use of two dynamic operators
〈doi(α)〉ϕ and [doi(α)]ϕ. The £rst one denotes that an agent i has to have the oppor-
tunity to perform the action α in such a way that ϕ will result from the performance
(Pessimistic Approach): A pessimistic agent needs certainty. The second one is the dual
of the £rst and states that if the opportunity to do α is present then ϕ would be among
the results of doi(α) (Optimistic Approach). The formula [doi(α)]ϕ is noncommittal
about the opportunity of the agent i to perform the action α. We do not go for such
a division and interpret the OPP formulae in a realistic manner linked with the RES
operator. Such a formalism helps in avoiding unwarranted results as were seen in the
earlier examples. In what follows we present the axioms capturing this intuition.
OR1 CAP(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒[
BEL(does(φ1)) ∧OPP(does(φ1)) ∧ RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥
∧ BEL(does(φ2)) ∧OPP(does(φ2))
]
OR2 GOAL(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒[
CAP(does(φ1)) ∧OPP(does(φ1)) ∧ RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥
∧ CAP(does(φ2)) ∧OPP(doesφ2)
]
OR3 CAP(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒[
BEL(CAP(does(φ1))) ∧OPP(does(φ1)) ∧ RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥)
∧ BEL(CAP(does(φ2))) ∧OPP(does(φ2))
]
OR4 GOAL(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒[
CAP(GOAL(does(φ1)) ∧OPP(does(φ1)) ∧ RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥)
∧ (CAP(GOAL(does(φ2)) ∧OPP(does(φ2))
]
OR5 INT(does(φ1;φ2)) ⇒[
CAP(INT(does(φ1)) ∧OPP(does(φ1)) ∧ RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥)
∧ (CAP(INT(does(φ2)) ∧OPP(does(φ2))
]
OR6 CAP(while Φ do ψ) ⇒
[
(Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(ψ)) ∧OPP(does(ψ))
∧ RES(done(ψ)) 6= ⊥) ∨ (¬Φ)
]
OR7 CAP(if Φ then φ1else φ2) ⇒

Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(φ1)) ∧OPP(does(φ1))∧
RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥) ∨
(¬Φ ∧ BEL(CAP(does(φ2)) ∧OPP(does(φ2))∧
RES(done(φ1)) 6= ⊥)


Axioms OR1–OR7 are a formalisation of the results and opportunities together with the
capability operator for composite actions. OR3 states that agents have the capability of
doing a composite action (φ1;φ2) to achieve Φ then the agent believes that it has the
capability, provided the right opportunity, in each of the atomic states and the resulting
condition is in alliance with its beliefs, i.e., it does not result in counterfactual situations.
The actual execution of actions is made explicit through such a formalisation. Similarly
OR6 states that if an agent has the Capability and Opportunity to perform a while-loop
then it keeps this opportunity under execution of the body of the loop as long as the
condition holds, i.e., as long as the result is true.
7 Commitment Axioms Revisited
In [13] a division is made in the commitment strategies of an agent, categorising an
agent as blindly committed agent, single minded agent, and open-minded agent. A
blindly committed agent maintains her intentions until she actually believes that she
has achieved them; the single minded agent maintains her intentions as long as she be-
lieves that they are still options; £nally an open-minded agent maintains her intentions
as long as the intentions are still her goals. Based on the semantics given in the previous
section the formalisation can be given as follows
CA1 INT(inevitable3Φ) ⇒
inevitable(INT(inevitable3Φ)
⋃
BEL(RES(Φ)))
CA2 INT(ineveitable3Φ) ⇒
inevitable(INT(inevitable3Φ)
⋃
BEL(CAP(Φ)) ∨ ¬BEL(OPP(optional3Φ)))
CA3 INT(ineveitable3Φ) ⇒
inevitable(INT(inevitable3Φ)
⋃
BEL(GOAL(Φ)) ∨ ¬CAP(optional3Φ))
The self-aware agent mentioned in [11] can be added to the above set of commitment
strategies directly. It seems that the formalisation depicted above is much more intuitive
than the one given by Rao and Georgeff [13]. For instance the axiom of blind commit-
ment states that, if an agent intends that inevitably Φ be eventually true, then the agent
will inevitably maintain its intentions until she believes in the result of Φ. The addition
of result is important in the sense that the blindly committed agent maintains the inten-
tions until the agent actually believes that she has achieved them, i.e., until the agent
has a justi£ed true belief. This condition is needed for an agent blindly-committed to
her means to inevitably eventually believe that she has achieved her means or ends.
It also seems to be in alliance with the philosophical theories concerning the nature
of belief. Similarly a single-minded agent maintains her intentions as long as she be-
lieves that she has got the capability for it. Since we do not say anything about an agent
optionally achieving particular means or ends, even if the opportunity is present, the
agent does not believe that optionally Φ be eventually true which is captured by the
¬BEL(OPP(optional3Φ)). Finally, an open-minded agent maintains her intentions as
long these intentions are still her goals or as long as she lacks the ability of optionally
achieving them.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
The representation and reasoning about composite actions in a BDI environment forms
the primary contribution of this work. Our work is motivated by the fact that many
BDI systems provide no clue as to the actual execution of actions, and are only able
to perform actions in an endogenous manner. When dealing with composite actions the
actual execution of actions need to be represented and reasoned about for the overall
success of the action. The addition of the two operators RES and OPP strengthens the
semantics and functions as a £lter in avoiding counterfactual situations. Though some
mention has been done in [3] about the composite action construct (φ1;φ2), it has been
restricted to the Intention domain and nothing has been mentioned regarding the result
of the actions. The only other comparable work is given by [10].
An explicit representation of temporal constructs can be seen as a further extension
to this work. We have used the temporal operator as a static variable. When it comes to
composite actions it is important to mention explicitly the time of each action and the
temporal duration of the commitment an agent has towards each action. The interpre-
tation of the © (next) operator in the original logic needs to be veri£ed. For example
when it comes to composite actions like (φ;ψ) the temporal operator © can be inter-
preted either as 3(φ ⇒ ©ψ) or (φ ⇒ ©ψ). The temporal notion as to whether the
action is performed now or eventually needs to be clari£ed. It would also be worthwhile
to investigate does(φ;ψ) in terms of (doneφ; doesψ), i.e., to £nd whether does(φ;ψ)
is concurrent or sequential.
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A Possible World Semantics
A structure M is a tuple M = 〈W, {Sw}, {Rw},B, D, I, L〉 where W is a set of pos-
sible worlds, Sw is a set of time points in world w; Rw ⊆ Sw × Sw is a total binary
temporal accessibility relation; L is a truth assignment function that assigns to each
atomic formula the set of world-time pairs at which it holds. B is a belief-accessibility
relation that maps a time-point in a world to a set of worlds that are belief accessible
to it; and D and I are desire and intention accessibility relations, respectively, that are
de£ned in the same way as B.
There are two types of formulas: state formulas (which are evaluated at a state in a
time-tree) and path formulas (which are evaluated against a path in a time-tree). They
are de£ned as follows.
– any propositional formula is a state formula; if Φ ∧ Φ′ are state formulas then so
too are Φ ∨ Φ′ and ¬Φ
– if Φ is a state formula then so too are BEL(Φ) and INT(Φ)
– if Ψ is a path formula then optional(Ψ) and inevitable(Ψ) are state formulas.
– Any state formula is also a path formula
– if Ψ and Ψ ′ are path formulas then so too are Ψ ∨ Ψ ′, ¬Ψ ,©Ψ , 3Ψ and 2ψ
A full path in w is an in£nite sequence of time points such that (wi, wi+1) ∈ Rw for all
i. Satisfaction of a state formula Φ is de£ned with respect to a structure M , a world w
and a time point t, denoted by M,wt |= Φ.
Satisfaction of a path formula Ψ is de£ned with respect to a structure M , a world
w, and a full path (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) in world w.
– M,wt |= Φ iff (w, t) ∈ L(Φ), where Φ is an atomic formula.
– M,wt |= ¬Φ iff M,wt 6|= Φ
– M,wt |= Φ1 ∨ Φ2 iff M,wt |= Φ1 or M,wt |= Φ2
– M, (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) |= Φ iff M,wt0 |= Φ, where Φ is a state formula.
– M, (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) |= ©Φ iff M, (wt1 , . . .) |= Φ
– M, (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) |= 3Ψ iff ∃wtk ∈ (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) s.t. M, (wtk , wtk+1 , . . .) |= Ψ
– M,wt0 |= 2Ψ iff M, (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) |= Ψ , for all full paths (wt0 , wt1 , . . .)
– M, (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) |= Φ1
⋃
Φ2 iff for some i ≥ 0, M,wt |= Φ2 and for all 0 ≤ j <
i, M,wtj |= Φ1
– M,wt0 |= optional(Ψ) iff there exists a full path (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) such that
M, (wt0 , wt1 , . . .) |= Ψ .
References
1. M. E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1987.
2. M.E. Bratman, D.J. Israel, and M.E Pollack. Plans and resource-bounded practical reasoning.
Computational Intelligence, 4:349–355, 1988.
3. Lawrenece Cavedon, Lin Padgham, Anand Rao, and Elizabeth Sonnenberg. Revisiting ra-
tionality for agents with intentions. In Eight Australian joint conference on Arti£cial Intelli-
gence, 1995.
4. E. A. Emerson. Temporal and Modal Logic. Elsevier, Cambridge, 1990.
5. M. Georgeff and F. Ingrand. Decision making in an embedded reasoning system. In In proc.
of the International Joint Conference on Arti£cial Intelligence- IJCAI, pages 972–978, 1989.
6. Bruce Vermazen & Merril Hintikka. Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events. Clarendon
Pres, Oxford, 1985.
7. M. Huber. Jam: A bdi-theoretic mobile agent architecture. In In Proceedings of the Third
International Confernce on Autonomous Agents - Agents 99, pages 236–243, Seattle, WA,
1999.
8. G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell. An Introduction to Modal Logic. Routledge, London,
1968.
9. Fischer K. and Muller J. P. & Pischel M. A pragmatic bdi architecture. In Michael J.
Woodridge, Muller J. P., and Milind Tambe, editors, Intelligent Agents II, Agent theories,
Architectures, and Languages, IJCAI’95 Workshop (ATAL),Montreal, Canada, volume 1037
of Lecture notes in Computer Science, pages 203–218. Springer-Verlag, 1996. subseries of
Lecture notes in Arti£cial Intelligence (LNAI).
10. Bernardus Van Linder. Modal Logic for Rational Agents. PhD thesis, Department of Com-
puter Science, Utrecht University, 19th June 1996.
11. Lin Padgham and Patrick Lambrix. Agent capabilities: Extending bdi theory. In Proceed-
ings of Seventeenth National Conference on Arti£cial Intelligence(AAAI-2000), pages 68–73,
Austin, Texas USA, July 30-August 3 2000. AAAI Press/The MIT Press.
12. Anand S. Rao. Means-end plam recognition- towards a theory of reactive recognition. Tech-
nical note - 49, Australian Arti£cial Intelligence Institute, 1994.
13. A.S. Rao and M.P. Georgeff. Modelling rational agents within a bdi-architecture. In Allen
J. Fikes R. Sandewall E., editor, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’91), pages 473–484. Morgan
Kaufmann, 1991.
